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NOTES 
The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or 
Due Protection? 
In Vlandis v. Kline1 and United States Department of Agricul-
ture v. Murry,2 decided during its past term, the Supreme Court in-
voked the conclusive presumption doctrine to invalidate statutory 
provisions,that restricted access to certain state and federal govern-
ment benefits.3 This term, in Cleveland Board of Education v. La-
Fleur,4 the Court used the same rationale to strike down school 
board rules requiring teachers to take maternity leaves without pay.6 
The essence of the doctrine is as follows: When a statutory provision 
imposes a burden upon a class of individuals for a particular pur-
pose and certain individuals within the burdened class are so situ-
ated that burdening them does not further that purpose, then the 
rigid statutory classification must be replaced, to the extent adminis-
tratively feasible, by an individual factual determination that more 
accurately selects the individuals who are to bear the statutory bur-
den. The legislature in such cases is said to have "conclusively pre-
sumed" that all members of the burdened class possess t)lose charac-
teristics that caused the burden to be imposed, and due process is 
found to require an individual opportunity to rebut this presump-
tion. The relatively few cases in which the Court applied this doc-
trine before last term involved such burdens as deprivation of prop-
erty through estate6 or income7 taxation, denial of the right to vote,8 
removal of children from their unmarried father's custody,0 and 
1. 412 U.S. 441 (1973), affg. 346 F. Supp. 526 (D. Conn. 1972) (three-judge court), 
2. 413 U.S. 508 (1973), 
3. In Vlandis, the benefit involved was a state subsidy of higher education for resi-
dents; in Murry, it was the provision of food stamps for needy households. 
4. 42 U.SL.W. 4186 (U.S., Jan. 21, 1974). 
5. The Supreme Court may have another opportunity to expand or explain the 
conclusive presumption doctrine in Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973) 
(three-judge court), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Geduldig v. Aiello, 42 U.S.L.W. 3362 
(U.S., Dec. 11, 1973) (No. 73-640), which involves a California statute that exempts preg-
nancy-related work loss from coverage under the state's disability insurance program 
until 28 days after termination of pregnancy. The three-judge district court used the 
so-called "means scrutiny" test, described in the text accompanying notes 97.99 infra, 
and concluded that the statute violated the equal protection clause. The issues involved 
in the case appear to be quite similar to those in LaFleur. 
6. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 280 
(1926). 
7. Hoeper v. Tax Commn., 284 U.S. 206 (1931). 
8. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (use of conclusive presumption doctrine 
under equal protection clause). 
9. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), See Comment, The Emerging Constitu• 
tional Protection of the Putative Father's Parental Rights, 70 l\fICH, L. REv. 1581 (1972), 
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suspension of a driver's license.10 This Note examines equal protec-
tion alternatives to the conclusive presumption doctrine that were 
apparently rejected by the Court; analyzes the doctrine itself in 
terms of constitutional language, judicial precedents, theoretical 
soundness, and practical workability; and concludes with a suggested 
equal protection standard that would serve the purposes of the doc-
trine while avoiding many of its difficulties. 
Vlandis involved a Connecticut statute that imposed a higher 
tuition rate on nonresidents attending state institutions of higher 
education th~n on residents.11 Single students were defined as non-
residents if their legal addresses were outside of Connecticut at any 
time during the one-year period immediately preceding application 
for admission,12 while married students were classified as non-
residents if their legal addresses were outside the state at the time 
of application.13 Once established, a student's residency status could 
not be changed during the period of his attendance at the Connecti-
cut institution.14 
Since even the higher nonresident tuition did not fully defray 
the cost of a higher education, all students received some degree of 
state subsidy,16 but residents were given a greater subsidy on the 
"assumption that the resident or his parents have supported the 
State in the past' and will continue to do so in the future."16 The 
legislative purpose behind the tuition differential was thus to favor 
those who were likely to have made or to make a contribution to 
the state fisc, while requiring students who were in Connecticut only 
for the benefit of a higher education to pay a greater portion of 
their mm way. 
The student's address at the date of application17 was adopted as 
a convenient rule-of-thumb, permitting easy administration by·avoid-
ing a more detailed inquiry into the personal circumstances of each 
student. Since application for admission is typically made several 
months in advance of the school semester, and since nonresident 
10. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
11. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-119a (Supp. 1973) (University of Connecticut). See 
also CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-116 (state colleges), 10-IOSc (state technical colleges), 
10-38h (regional community colleges) (Supp. 1973). Nonresidency was statutorily defined. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-329b(a)(l)-(2) (Supp. 1973). Beginning with the spring sem-
ester of 1972, nonresident students at the University of Connecticut were required to pay 
425 dollars for tuition in addition to a 200-dollar nonresident fee, while resident stu-
dents were required to pay only 175 dollars for tuition. 412 U.S. at 444. 
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-329b(a)(2) (Supp. 1973). 
13. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-329b(a)(3) (Supp. 1973). 
14. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-329b(a)(5) (Supp. 1973). 
15. Brief for Appellant at 11. 
16. Id. 
17. The difference in the definition as applied to single and married students will 
be ignored for the purposes of this Note since it was of no significance in the case. 
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students are unlikely to have established a Connecticut address at 
that early date, the statutory definition appeared to be a reasonably 
accurate means of separating nonresidents from residents. Residency 
status was made unchangeable to avoid difficulties of proofA since 
it seemed difficult to establish a genuine change in residency among 
"college students who seldom. have set plans for their future 
homes."18 
The plaintiffs in Vlandis were students at the University of 
Connecticut who had applied for admission from outside the state 
but who had acquired such contacts with the state as a permanent 
home (plaintiff Kline), a driver's license, car registration, and voter 
registration. Claiming to be bona fide Connecticut residents, they 
sued in federal district court for a declaration that the statutory 
definition of nonresident was unconstitutional under the due pro-
cess and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 
The plaintiffs' equal protection argument urged alternatively that 
there was an impingement on their right to travel10 or, in any 
case, that the classifications created by the statute were not rationally 
related to its goals.20 Their due process claim rested upon the con-
clusive presumption doctrine: The plaintiffs argued that their right 
to procedural due process was violated since the statute permanently 
and irreversibly classified them as nonresidents.21 
The three-judge district court did not consider the plaintiffs' due 
process and equal protection claims separately, relying upon Bolling 
v. Sharpe22 for the proposition that the standard in the instant case 
would be the same under either clause.23 The court found the Con-
ne~ticut statute "arbitrary and unreasonable" on its face and there-
fore did not reach the right-to-travel argument.24 With regard to 
18. Brief for Appellant at 15. See also 412 U.S. at 451. 
19. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
20. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). For ex• 
amples of recent applications of tbe rational relation standard witb less judicial defer• 
ence, see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 488 (1972), 
See generally Note, Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre: The New, New Equal Protection, 
72 MICH. L REv. 508 (1974), 
21. Botb tbe district court and the Supreme Court state tbat tbe plaintiffs argued a 
violation of tbe due process clause. See 412 U.S. at 444; 346 F. Supp. at 527, The plain• 
tiffs' complaints actually do not mention tbe due process clause. See Appendix at 4a•5a, 
13a•14a. 
22. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
23, 346 F. Supp. at 528. The district court's reasoning in this regard seems open to 
dispute, since Bolling merely established tbat tbe fiftb amendment due process clause 
and tbe fourteentb amendment equal protection clause are "not mutually exclusive," 
347 U.S. at 499, and tbat equal protection requirements can tbus be applied to the 
federal government by way of tbe fifth amendment. This does not imply that the 
fourteentb amendment equal protection and due process standards are identical. 347 
U.S. at 499. The use of tbe fourteentb amendment due process clause to deal with 
equal protection probJems would make the equal protection clause superfluous. 
24. 346 F. Supp. at 529 n.4. 
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the conclusive presumption argument, the court ruled that ''the state 
may not classify as 'out of state students' those who do not belong 
in that class."25 Finding the plaintiffs to be bona fide Connecticut 
residents, the distric;t court concluded that the statute violated the 
fourteenth amendment. The court entered a permanent injunction 
against further enforcement of the statute and ordered a partial 
tuition refund to plaintiffs for the spring semester of 1972. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court ;;tffiu:ned. Justice Stewart's opin-
ion wholly ignored plaintiffs' equal protection arguments, although 
equal protection was clearly the focus of both parties' briefs26 and 
oral arguments.27 Rather, the Court decided the case on the sole 
ground of the conclusive presumption doctrine, formulating the 
standard as follows: 
In sum, since Connecticut purports to be concerned ·with resi-
dency in allocating the rates for tuition and fees at its university sys-
tem, it is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to (ieny an individual 
the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable pre-
sumption of nonresiclence, when that presumption is not necessarily 
or universally true in fact, and when the State l!as rea&on~ble alter-
native means of making the crucial determination. Rather, ~tandards 
of due process require that the State allow such an individual the 
opportunity to present evidence showing t;Jiat he is a bona fi.de resi-
dent entitled to the in-state rates.28 
United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,29 handed 
down two weeks after Vlandis, involved an amendment:3° to the Food 
Stamp Act of l964;,81 The over-all legislative objective behind the 
food-stamp program was "to safeguard the health and well-being of 
the Nation's population and· raise levels of nutrition among low-
income households."82 By 1970, Congress had become concerned that 
25. 346 F. Supp. at 528, citing Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (19$2). 
26. Connecticut's brief dealt solely with equal protection arguments. P~aintiffs' brief 
devoted only 11 of 59 pages to due process; the remainqer c;oncentrated on equal pro-
tection. 
27. Letter from John A. Dziamba, counsel for plaintiffs, to Michigan Law Review, 
Sept. 13, 1973, at 3. 
28. 412 U.S. at 452. -
29. 413 U.S. 508 (1973). 
30. Act of Jan. 11, 1971, Pub. L. No.
1
9H571, § 4, 84 Stat. 2049 (coclified at 7 U.S.C. 
§ 2014(b) (1970)). 
31. Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat, 703 (codified ~t 7 U.S.Q, §§ 2()11-25 (1970), as 
amended, (Supp. II, 1972)). 
32, 7 u.s.c. § 2011 (1970). T~e federal food-stamp pro~ is administered by the 
states in connection with other federally aided public assistance programs. 7 U.S,C. 
§ 2013 (1970). The Act requires the states to follow "uniform national standards of 
eligibility" established by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 7 U.S.C. 
§ 2014 (b) (1970), that are designed to take account of income and other financial re-
sources available to recipient households in order to limit the benefits of the program 
"to those households whose income and other financial resources are determined to 
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the food-stamp program was being abused by the nonneedy, 83 in 
particular by "college students, children of wealthy parents."34 Com-
plaints from constituents had led at least some Congressmen to specu-
late that, if such abuses were not checked, public pressure might ulti-
mately lead to the destruction of the entire program.80 The 
congressional response to this pressure was the following amendment: 
Any household which includes a member who has reached his eigh-
teenth birthday and who is claimed as a dependent cltlld for Federal 
income tax purposes by a taxpayer who is not a member of an eligi-
ble household, shall be ineligible to participate in any food stamp 
program established pursuant to this chapter during the ta." period 
such dependency is claimed and for a period of one year after expira-
tion of such tax period.36 
Since the tax exemption is generally available only if the tax-
payer provides over half of the dependent child's support,37 the 
draftsmen apparently thought it likely that households that included 
such dependents would have an independent source of income and 
thus be unlikely to need food stamps. While that is probably true 
as a general rule, the plaintiffs in Murry came from needy house-
holds that were precluded from food-stamp relief by the operation 
of the amendment. They were represented by welfare rights advo-
cates of the New York-based Food Research and Action Center, who 
were aware that the plaintiffs presented the most sympathetic fact 
situations for a test case challenge of the amendment.38 
be substantial limiting factors in permitting them to purchase a nutritionally ade• 
quate diet." 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) (1970). In practical operation, the recipient houscl1old 
typically obtains certification from its local welfare agency after a determination of 
the household's eligibility in a caseworker interview. Coupons with a face value con• 
sidered sufficient to purchase a "nutritionally adequate diet," 7 U.S.C. § 2016(a) (1970), 
are then purchased by the recipient, usually at a local bank, at a rate adjusted accord• 
ing to the household's need. The payment schedule is designed to require a "reasonable 
investment," in no case more than 80 per cent of its income, from the household, 7 
U.S.C. § 2016(b) (1970). Coupons thus obtained may be exchanged at government• 
approved retail stores for any domestic food (but not liquor or tobacco) at prevailing 
market prices. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(b) (1970). 
33. "The most serious criticisms of the present program have been directed toward 
misuse of food stamps." [1970] 3 U.S. CoDE CONG. & .ADMIN. NEWS 6048 (Representative 
Catherine May). See also 116 CONG. R.Ec. 41979 (1970) (remarks of Representative Latta) 
("Every Member has been back home often this year and has heard the many, many 
complaints on the misuse of this program •..• I, for one, do not wish to see these 
complaints multiplying year after year and threatening the existence of the program for 
those genuinely in need.'). 
, 84. 116 CONG. R.Ec. 41979 (1970) (remarks of Representative Latta), 
85. Id. See also 116 CoNG. Ric. 41982 (remarks of Representative Poage), 41983 (re• 
marks of Representative Hutchinson), 42021 (remarks of Representative Belcher) (1970), 
86. 7 u.s.c. § 2014(b) (1970). 
87. INTERNAL REvENUE CODE OF 1954, § 152(a). 
88. Letter from Ronald F. Pollack, attorney for plaintiffs, to Michigan Law Review, 
March 7, 1974. 
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Of the eight plaintiffs chosen to represent the class of households 
adversely affected by the provision, Mrs. Murry may be regarded 
as typical. Her household included herself, her two sons, one of 
whom was nineteen, and her two grandchildren. The household's 
sole source of income consisted of court-ordered child support pay-
ments of $57.50 per month from her ex-husband. When he claimed 
the two sons and one grandson as dependents in his income-tax re-
turn, Mrs. Murry's household was denied food stamps. 
A class action was brought in federal district court to enjoin 
enforcement of the provision as a violation of plaintiffs' fifth amend-
ment rights to due process and equal protection.39 The three-judge 
panel granted the relief requested, stating that 
the Amendment wholly missed its target. By creating an irrebuttable 
presumption contrary to fact, the Amendment classifies households 
arbitrarily along lines that have no rational relationship to the 
statutory scheme or the Amendment's apparent purpose. It creates 
a classification which denies similar treatment to all persons similarly · 
situated and is, on its face and by its operation as established in this 
record, grossly unfair. Thus, there is both a denial of due process 
and of equal protection.40 
In an opinion ·written by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court 
affirmed. As in Vlandis, primary attention in the briefs was devoted 
to equal protection arguments,41 yet again the equal protection claim 
was ignored in the Court's opinion. The Court found that the pro-
vision created "a conclusive presumption that the 'tax dependent's' 
household is not needy and has access to nutritional adequacy."42 
It concluded "that the deduction taken for the benefit of the parent 
in the prior year is not a rational measure of the need of a different 
household with which the child of the tax-deducting parent lives 
and rests on an irrebuttable presumption often contrary to fact. It 
therefore lacks critical ingredients of due process . . . _.''43 Al-
though Justice Douglas had joined in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in 
Vlandis,44 he cited that case as precedent for the doctrine applied in 
Murry.45 
39. An equal protection component was read into the fifth amendment in Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 
(1969); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964). 
40. Murry v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 348 F. Supp. 242, 243 (D.D.C. 1972). 
41. The government devoted a single footnote to the due process argument in its 
main brief, Brief for Appellants at 7 n.4, and less than 3 pages in its reply brief. Reply 
Brief for Appellants at 10-12. Appellees used only 15 out of 50 pages in the argument 
section of their brief for the due process claim. Brief for Appellees at 57-72. 
42. 413 U.S. at 511. 
43. 413 U.S. at 513. 
44. 412 U.S. at 463. 
45. 413 U.S. at 513. Although Justice Douglas did not look at the purpose of the 
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Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur46 involved a rule, 
adopted by the Cleveland Board of Education, that imposed manda-
tory, unpaid maternity leaves upon pregnant school teachers for a 
period beginning five months before the child's expected birth and 
extending until the next regular school semester after the child 
reached the age of three months. While testimony from the rule's 
original draftsmen suggested that its purpose was to prevent em-
barrassment to pregnant teachers and to avoid classroom disruption 
caused by giggling schoolchildren,41 the school board attempted to 
justify the rule as "an orderly and efficient procedure to maintain 
an adequate continuity of able-bodied classroom teachers."48 Since 
most pregnant teachers would have to leave school at some stage in 
their pregnancy, and since women in the late stages of pregnancy 
were believed unable adequately to perform teaching duties,40 the 
five-month cut-off date was argued to fulfill "the administrative need 
for a uniform rule" and to clfford adequate notice to allow the school 
to obtain a substitute teacher.60 
The plaintiffs in LaFleur were not due to give birth until mid-
summer and desired to continue teaching through the end of the 
school year. When they were, nonetheless, required to take unpaid 
mciternity leave beginning in Marc;h, they challenged the rule in 
federal distrjct ~ourt as a violatiop. of equal protection. The ·su-
preme Coµrt found the school board rule unconstitutional. Al-
though the case had been argued and decided purely on equal pro-
tectio11 grounds in both lower courts51 and had been treated by all 
statute, Justice Stewart, in his concurrence, noted that "alleviating hunger and mal• 
nutrition among the needy" was one of the statute's purposes. 413 U.S. at 514. Justice 
Stewart then concluded that Vl1mdis applied and that the plaintiffs should bave been 
given the opportunity to show that they 1vere, in fact, needy. 413 U.S. at 516•17, He also 
noted that "alternative means" were available to Congress for achieving its desire to 
restrict abuse of the food stamp program. 413 U.S. at 517 n.2. 
46. 42 U.S.L.W. 4186 (U.S., Jan. 21, 1974). LaFleur was a consolidation of two cases, 
the second involving a similar rule adopted by the school board of Chesterfield County, 
Virginia. Since the facts of the two cases were essentially similar, only LaFleur will be 
discussed in this Note. 
47. Appendix at 173a (Deposition of Dr. Mark C. Schinnerer, April 13, 1971). See 
also 42 u.s.r..w. at 4189 n.9. 
48. Brief for Petitioners at 19. 
49. Id. at 7-11. 
50. Id. at 12. 
51. Finding that "there is a reasonable basis for the rule which distinguishes preg· 
nant teachers from all other teachers," LaFleur v, Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 326 F, Supp, 
1208, 1214 (N.D. Ohio 1971), the district court held that "the plaintiffs' burden of 
showing that the maternity ll'!ave of absence is arbitrary and unreasonable," 326 F, 
Supp. at 1214, had not been carried. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding a violation of 
the plaintiffs' right to equ_al protection: "This record indicates ckarly that pregnant 
women teachers have been singled out for unconstitutionally unequal restrictions upon 
their employment." LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184, 1188 (6th Cir. 
1972). 
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parties as an equal protection case in briefs~2 and oral argument513 at 
the Supreme Court level, Justice Stewart's majority opinion rested 
the decision squarely upon the due process conclusive presumption 
doctrine:uio 
Even assuming arguendo that there are some women who would be 
physically unable to work past the particular cut-off dates embodied 
in the challenged rules, it is evident that there are large numbers of 
teachers who are fully capable of continuing work £or longer than 
the . . . regulations will allow. Thus, the conclusive presumption 
embodied in these rules, like that in Vlandis, is neither "necessarily 
nor universally true," and is violative of the Dµe :Process Clause.55 
Vlandis and Murry both involved statutes with the over-all pur-
pose of distributing government largesse among a class of benefi-
ciaries possessing certain characteristics. Both cases also h1volved 
statutory provisions designed to restrict the receipt of benefits to the 
intended class. The draftsmen sought to do this by defining, in a 
manner that could be easily administered, a class of individuals who 
were thought unlikely to possess the characteristics of the intended 
recipients. Thus, in Vlandis, those who applied for admission from 
ou~ide the state were considered unlikely to be residents and un-
likely to become residents during their attendance at the university. 
In Murry, tax-dependent household& were believed unlikely to lack, 
financial :,;esources sufficient to purchase an adequate diet. 
52. Letter from Charles F. Clarke, couns<'!l for the school board, to Michigan Law 
Reuiew, Feb. 6, 1974. See generally Brief for Petitioners. 
53. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Oct. 15, 1973 [on file at the Michig(ln Law 
Review]. The sole reference to due process in the case appears to have been the fol-
lowing exchange between Mrs. Picker, counsel for respondents, and Justice Stewart: 
Q. Mrs. Picker, you have referred to the 14th Amendment. Do you view tliis 
case as exclusively involving the Equal Protection Clause? 
MRS. PICKER; Yes, we do, Your t{onar. 
Q. You do not view it as involving the Due Process Clause at all? 
MRS. PICKER: Well, Your Honor, we did not think to plead that. originally, and 
I am not sure that that is particularly detrimental to our case. We have learned a 
lot since the pleadings were originally filed in this case. It was prior to Stanley of 
course, and indeed prior to Reed v. Reed. It seems to me as though we indeed had 
a violation here of Due Process as well as Equal Protection, but we did not plead it. 
And therefore we have not argued it. 
Id. at 38. 
54. As noted above, the Court also decided the Vlandis and Murry cases on grounds 
that were only scantily argued and briefe\l by the partie$, See text accompanying notes 
26-27 & 4l supra, The practic~ of the Court in these cases is certainly open to criticism. 
It is unfair to the parties in that they are not allowed to present arguments to the 
Court on the issue that the Court decides is controlling, and it is unfair to the Court 
itself because the Court loses the benefit of an issue's being briefed and argued bdore 
it. For one reaction to this type of judicial action, $ee Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 
659-62 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In cases such as LaFleµr a jurisdictional prob-
lem may be presented because review of fetleral courts of appeals' decisions "shall be 
restricted to the Federal questions presented •••• " 28 U,$.C. § 1254(2) (1970). 
55. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4190. 
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The. regulation involved in LaFleur, on the other hand, did not 
restrict the receipt of government benefits but imposed a burden 
(involuntary and unpaid maternity leave) upon the class of teachers 
more than four months pregnant. This classification rested initially 
upon a moral judgment-pregnant teachers should not be seen by 
schoolchildren after they begin to "show" -but was later justified 
by an empirical assessment-most women who are four-months preg-
nant are unable adequately to carry out teaching duties. 
In each case, the draftsmen might have sought to achieve the 
legislative purpose in limiting the class by writing that purpose 
directly into the provision.66 This method would seem sufficiently 
flexible to be immune from attack under the conclusive presump-
tion doctrine, but it would give rise to at least two problems not 
present in the statutes as they were actually written. First, such pro-
visions would give considerable discretion to those charged with 
administering the respective programs.67 With each administrator 
applying the broad language in light of his individual biases, the 
results would be uneven, thus denying equal treatment to those af-
fected, and unpredictable, thus failing to provide adequate notice 
to those coming under the law.58 Second, they would be much more 
difficult and expensive to administer.60 It is, therefore, not surprising 
that the draftsmen chose instead, for reasons of consistency, predicta-
bility, convenience, and economy, to draw "bright lines." 
Yet, as the instant cases illustrate, and as the draftsmen of the 
provisions were no doubt aware, 60 the use of such rules of thumb has 
56. Thus, for example, the Connecticut statute might have read: Students wl10 in-
tend to reside indefinitely in the state after graduation, or who have made significant 
past contributions to the state, shall be classified as residents for tuition purposes. 
5'7. Tussman 8: tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF, L. REv. 341, 
347 (1949). . 
58. Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 MICH. L. REv. 831, ff,12-43 
(1923). See generally Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme 
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960). 
59. As the government argued in Murry: 
[A]ppellees' argument with respect to procedural due process is based on the 
erroneous premises that the basic eligibility criterion is "need" and that applicants 
should be entitled to demonstrate need notwithstanding their failure to satisfy 
other statutory requirements. But since "need" is not a concept which either by its 
nature or as a result of a long history of judicial consideration has a clearly ascer• 
tainable content, Congress wisely chose not to make "need" the statutory standard 
for food stamp eligibility. This decision reflected in part an awareness that the 
determination of "need" on a case-by-case basis would be administratively un-
workable. 
Reply Brief for Appellants at 11. 
60. It was argued in debate on the House floor that the tax dependency provision 
was overinclusive: "In some ways the most surprising deficiency in the committee bill 
is its total failure to deal effectively with those who do not deserve food stamps benefits. 
It attempts to do this by denying stamps to many students and by imposing a work 
provision. Both of these, however, will hurt many innocent and deserving members of 
such households." 116 CoNG. REc. 42026 (1970) (remarks of Representative Conte). 
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the vice of inaccuracy. Faced with the conflict between accurately 
selecting those who are intended to -be burdened or benefited and 
drafting statutes that can be effectively administered, most legisla-
tures are likely to strike a compromise. Instead of trying to reach all 
those who might conceivably come within the legisl?,tive intent, 
they are satisfied to reach most of those, if that can be done with a 
statute that will be reasonably consistent, predictable, convenient, 
and economical in administration. 
The decision of precisely how much inaccuracy to tolerate in 
the name of effective administration involves the weighing of a num-
ber of factors. In addition to the administrative considerations, these 
factors include the seriousness of the problem that the limiting pro-
vision is intended to remedy and the degree of hardship suffered by 
those who are burdened or fail to receive a benefit. Thus, if the 
abuse of food stamps by nonneedy college students were great, a 
somewhat overbroad prophylactic countermeasure such as the tax 
dependency amendment might be easier to tolerate than it would 
be if the abuse were minimal. Similarly, if the degree of hardship 
on college students classed as nonresidents were small, it might be 
easier to tolerate an overinclusive nonresident category than it 
would be if the hardship were great. And, if most women teachers 
were indeed seriously incapacitated in the later stages of pregnancy, 
an overbroad leave requirement would be more palatable. 
This balancing of interests might well be viewed as a decision 
within the legislative, rather than the judicial, competence. In any 
case, Vlandis, Murry, and LaFleur raise the basic constitutional is-
sues of the degree of permitted legislative discretion in balancing 
the need for accuracy in apportioning governmental burdens and 
benefits against the need for line-drawing and sound administration, 
and of the proper role of the Court in supervising the exercise of 
this discretion. 
I. EQUAL PROTECTION: THE REJECTED APPROACH 
As indicated above, the Vlandis and Murry cases were argued 
primarily on equal protection grounds and can easily be analyzed 
in equal protection terms. Both cases involved statutory provisions 
that established two classes of persons with respect to government 
benefits: nonrecipients (outstate applicants and tax dependent house-
holds) and recipients (instate applicants and non-tax dependent 
households that met other criteria). LaFleur, argued solely on equal 
protection grounds, is also susceptible of equal protection analysis. 
The school board regulation established two classes: the burdened 
(teachers more than four-months pregnant) and the nonburdened 
(all other teachers). While the intensity of judicial review may vary 
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depencling on the nature of the case, the basic equal protection issue 
is whether these distinctions between classes are jmtified. 
In consb;uing tlie equal protection cla'Qse, the Supreme Court 
has developed a doctrinal pattern under which the intensity of ju-
dicial review altemates between two poles depending on the nature 
of the case, ,At the activist pole, statutes involving '1fundamental in-
terests" or "s'Qspect classifications" are strictly scrutinized, while at 
the deferential pole, statutes involving social or economic matters are 
allowed to stand if they exhibit minim,d rationality, 
At least since Skinner v. 0 klahoma, 61 the Court has applied strict 
sqµtiny to legislative classifications which impinge upon fundamen• 
tal interests. Interests heretofore recognized as fundamental have 
been the right to procreate, 62 the right to vote, 63 the right to travel, o-1 
and possibly some aspects of personal privacy. 61i Strict scrutiny also ap• 
plies when the legislation under review creates certain suspect 
classifications, Classifications are suspect when based on race,0o na, 
tionality. 67 and alienage;68 probably suspect when based on illegiti-
macy69 and poverty (when poverty results in an absolute depriva, 
tion);70 and p9ssibly suspect when based on sex.71 
Strict scrutiny means that the ordinary presumption in favor 
of a statute's constitutionality72 is not entertained. Instead, the gov-
eril!llent is given the burden of demonstrating that a ~•compelling 
governmental interest'' makes the particular classification necessary. 
Even if such a cop:1pelling interest is shown, the classification is not 
deemed necessary if the same interest could be furthered by less 
drastic means.7? Once the strict scrutiny test is invoked, the govern-
61. 316 u.s. 535 (1942), 
62. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
63. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 4Q5 U.S. 330 (1972); :tiarper v. Virgipi4 l3d, of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
64. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618 (1969). 
65. See the Court's interpretation of Loving y, Virgiqia, 388 U.S, 1 (1967), and 
Eisenstadt v. :Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) 
(implying that a fundamental right of ,flrivacy had been recognized in these equal pro-
tection cases). 
66. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 
(1964). 
67. E.g., Oyama, v California, 332 U.S. 633 (1947), 
68, Grali:un v. Rich~dson, 403 U,S, 365 (1971). 
69. Gomez v. Per~, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam). 
70. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). S11ey San .l\tltonio Indc;_\)endent School Dist, 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1973), 
71. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion), 
72. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Lindsley v. Natural Car• 
bonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). 
73. Shapjro v. Thompson, 394 U.S, 618 (196P), See alsp ?,-!ichelman, The Supreme 
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ment is rarely able to carry its heavy burden. 74 Thus, the choice of 
the mode of adjudication is often determinative of the outcome of 
the case.76 
In Vlandis, the appellees argued that the strict scrutiny standard 
was applicable due to an impingement on their right to travel.76 
Relying heavily on Shapiro v. Thompson77 and Dunn v. Blumstein,78 
cases that involved durational residency requirements for welfare 
benefits and voter registration, respectively, the plaintiffs urged that 
Connecticut's permanent, irrebuttable .residency classification penal-
ized bona fide residents who had recently moved into the state. 
While this argument is not without some merit, 79 the Court ap-
parently viewed the burden on interstate travel created by higher 
nonresident tuition rates as distinguishable from the burdens in-
volved in Shapiro and Dunn, which were the total deprivation of 
welfare benefits and the right to vote, the lattei: itself a fundamental 
interest. In any event, the right to travel argument was not dealt 
with by the Court.so 
With the exception of Justice Matshall's concurrence in Vlan-
dis,81 none or the opinions in Vlandis or Murry suggests that strict 
Court, 1968 Term-Foteword: On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth A.mend-
tllent, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7, 20 n,34 (1969). 
'74. For a rare example, see K.orematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (exclu-
siort of all Japanese-Americans from certain West Coast areas upheld in view of the 
tompelling state interest believed to have been created by the war emergency). See also 
Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973). 
75, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J.; dissenting). 
76. Brief for Appellees at 11-29. 
77. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
78. 405 U.S. 330 (1972), 
'79. 'rhe appellees \vere able to point to a study by the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare that 'cortcluded that "higher out-of-state tuition fees tend to discour-
age migratiort across Slate lines.'' Brief £or Appellees at 18, quoting U.S. Dept, of Health 
Educ., &: Welfare, Analytic Repott on Residehce and Migratlon of College Students 2 
(1968). 
80. See also Starns v, Malkerson, 326 F. SUPP,· 234 (D. Minn. 1970), affd. mem., 401 
U.S. 985 (1971) (upholding nonresident tuition scheme). 
81. Justice Mal'Shall's conellrtence does speak of "serious equal protection questions 
raised by this and other tuition residency laws," 412 U.S. at 455, citing Dunn and 
Shapiro, but does not discuss 111hat they might be. 
Another line of strict scrutiny argument in the Vlandis situation would be to char-
acte~e education as a fundamental interest. However, San Antonio Independent School 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), in which the Court expressly refused to declare 
education to be a fundamental right, appears to have foreclosed this argument. 
In Murry, no attempt was made to bring the case under the strict scrutiny standard. 
Although at least one commentator has suggested that the interest in subsistehce is 
fundamental as a consequence of the Shapiro decision, Michelman, supra note 73, at 
40 n.94, a recent line of cases pas emphasized that the Court will apply the rational 
relation standard of equal protection review to cases involving welfare legislation. 
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (unequal reductions in federal welfare pro-
grams); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (reduction in social security benefits 
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scrutiny was applicable. However, Justice Stewart's opinion in 
Vlandis refers several times to the availability of "reasonable alterna-
tive means"82 with which to classify students as resident and non-
resident, an approach highly reminiscent of the "less drastic means" 
aspect of strict scrutiny review, although raised in the context of due 
process rather than equal protection. This prompted Chief Justice 
Burger to note in dissent: "There will be, I fear, some ground for 
belief that the Court now engrafts the 'close judicial scrutiny' test 
onto the Due Process Clause whenever we deal with something like 
'permanent irrebuttable presumptions.' "83 
In LaFleur, the respondents argued both branches of the strict 
scrutiny doctrine. They urged that the right to bear and raise chil-
dren was fundamental84 and that the rule in question established a 
classification based on sex, a suspect classification.86 
As to the plaintiffs' fundamental right argument, the school 
board replied that the only right affected by the maternity-leave rule 
was "an asserted 'right' temporarily to be employed as a Cleveland 
school teacher while in an advanced stage of pregnancy."80 The 
Court, however, appeared to recognize a possible impingement upon 
the rights "of personal choice in matters of marriage and family 
Iife"87 and stated that "[b ]y acting to penalize the pregnant teacher 
for deciding to bear a child, overly restrictive maternity leave regula-
tions can constitute a heavy burden on the exercise of these protected 
freedoms."88 Nevertheless, the Court did not use this impingement 
for recipients of workmen's compensation); Dandridge v. Williams, 897 U.S. 471 (1970) 
(AFDC benefit ceiling based on family size). 
82, 412 U.S. at 451-52. 
83. 412 U.S. at 462. A similar use of equal protection language in a due process case 
was made in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. ll3 (1973), a landmark decision subsuming the right 
of a woman to have an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy under the right 
of privacy. There the Court said that "[w]hcre certain 'fundamental rights' arc involved, 
the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a 
'compelling state interest.'" 410 U.S. at 155. Justice Rehnquist dissented: 
The Court eschews the history of the Fourteenth Amendment in its reliance on 
the "compelling state interest" test .••• But the Court adds a new wrinkle to this 
test by transposi11g it from the legal considerations associated with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to this case arising under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Unless I misapprehend the consequences 
of this transplanting of the "compelling state interest test," the Court's opinion will 
accomplish the seemingly impossible feat of leaving this area of the law more con-
fused than it found it. 
410 U.S. at 173. 
84. Brief for Respondents at 41, citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (19421 
and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
85. ~rief for Respondents at 28-41. 
86. Brief for Petitioners at 16. 
87. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4189. 
88. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4189. 
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as a ground for invoking strict scrutiny but only to indicate a de-
privation of liberty rendering the due process clause applicable.89 
The only reference by any member of the Court to the plaintiffs' 
sex classification argument is in a footnote to Justice Powell's con-
currence, where he merely states that he does not reach the ques-
tion.00 
Unlike the strict scrutiny standard, the traditional equal protec-
tion standard creates a strong presumption of constitutionality for 
legislation dealing with economic or social matters.91 This standard 
puts the burden on the challenger to show that the statutory classi-
fication has no reasonable basis and enjoins the Court to assume any 
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could justify the classifica-
tion.92 Legislation of even the most tenuous rationality has been up-
held under this standard.93 Since this more restrained equal protec-
tion test has recently been held applicable to cases involving educa-
tion94 and welfare,95 it would appear apposite to t!-'ie Vlandis, Murry, 
89. It should be noted that, although the right to bear children is somewhat a£. 
fected by the maternity leave requirement, the impingement is at most temporary and 
indirect. Thus, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), involving total deprivation 
of the right to procreate, is distinguishable. Perhaps the Court requires a direct and 
heavy burden before the fundamental right-equal protection line of argument can suc-
ceed, while only an indirect impingement suffices as a deprivation of liberty for due 
process purposes. Cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
19-22 (1973) (suggesting total deprivation of a right is necessary to trigger strict scru-
tiny). 
90. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4193 n.2. There is also a question of whether LaFleur involved 
a classification based on sex in the first instance. The school board argued ,that 
the record is clear that the sex characteristic has nothing whatsoever to do with the 
mandatory maternity leave •.•• It has nothing to do with sex as such, but only 
~ when the condition of sex voluntarily creates another condition-pregnancy. Even 
then pregnancy is not the determining classification, but it is only when the time 
comes, on the basis of reasonable medical evidence and administrative necessity, 
that her pregnancy makes the school teacher physically disabled within the environ-
ment of the school classroom that the classification applies. 
Brief for Petitioners at 23-24. See also Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 
F.2d 395, 397 (4th Cir. 1973) (Haynsworth, C.J.), revd., 42 U.S.L.W. 4186 (U.S., Jan. 22, 
1974). In view of the purpose of strict scrutiny, which is to look 'more closely at statutes 
that have an impact on groups with a history of discrimination, United States v. Caro-
lene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), however, it should suffice that the rule 
affected women and did not affect men. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 
1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (construing title VII of the Civil Rights Act). Nonetheless, the 
Court avoided the issue, perhaps because of the difficulty foreseen in dealing with laws 
prohibiting prostitution and job safety regulations prohibiting beards, to cite two com-
mon examples. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 53, at 21-24. 
91. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). 
92. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-27 (1961). 
93. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway 
Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
94. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
95. See cases cited in note 81 supra. 
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and LaFleur cases. However, under this standard it appears that the 
provisions involved would easily have been upheld. 
As can be seen from the above discussion, the two-tiered system 
of equal protection is inflexible. Choice of which tier is applicable in 
a given case tends to predetermine the result. In the vast majority 
of cases, if strict scrutiny is applied, the legislation is struck do'Wn; 
if the minimum rationality standard is invoked, the legislation is 
sustained. Yet there are cases, such as Vlandis, Murry, and LaFleur, 
in which the Court may desire to intervene despite the presence of 
a rational basis for the statutory classification and the absence of a 
fundamental interest or suspect classification. Two approaches have 
been suggested that would permit a more flexible equal protection 
analysis.96 
Professor Gerald Gunther has observed a trend in certain of the 
Supreme Court's recent decisions97 toward an "intensified means 
scrutiny," which would "close the wide gap between the strict scru-
tiny of the new equal protection and the minimal scrutiny of the old 
not by abandoning the strict but by raising the level of the minimal 
from virtual abdication to gehuine judicial inquiry!'08 Guhther 
denominates this middle tier the 11newer" equal protection, which, 
he says, would "have the Court take seriously a constitutional re-
quirement that has hever been formally abandoned: that legislative 
means must substantially further legislative ends."99 
This approach demands Uvo prerequisites. First, a legislative pur-
pose must be imputed to the statute apart from its operative lan-
guage and its total effect. Othenvise, there would be no distinction 
between the legislative means (specifically, language and effect) and 
the legislative end. Second, the Court must be willing and able to 
engage in empiric "legislative" fact-finding in order to assess whether 
the means "substantially further" the ends. 
In Vlandis and Murry, the Court was willing to find a purpose 
behittd the provisions involved,100 since this ·was necessary before the 
conclusive presumption analysis could be applied.101 However, it 
96. See generally Note, Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre: The New, New £qual 
Protection, 72 :M1CH. L. REv. 508 (19'74). 
9'7. E.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: Stir. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438 (19'72); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (19'71). 
98. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. I, 
24 (1972). 
99. Id. at 20. 
100. See note 45 supra and text accompanying notes 28 8.: 55 supra. 
101. Although Justice Douglas did not discuss the purpose of the food-stamp J?ro• 
gram in Murry, Justice Stewart, the author of P'landis and LaFleur, did so itt his con-
currence. See note 45 supra. It is necessary for n court applying the test to Jmpute a 
purpose to the statute other than that indicated by the operative statutory language. It 
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does not appear that data were available from which the efficacy of 
the means in furthering the ends could be established. Thus, the 
"newer" equal protection approach could not be applied, at least 
not in Gunther's sense of a "genuine judicial inquiry." In LaFleur, 
on the other hand, the substantial medical testimony102 and litera-
ture103 before the Court would have provided a basis for assessing the 
degree of disability encountered in late pregnancy. Moreover, Justice 
Powell, concurring in the result, appeared to apply a form of means-
focused analysis. While purpotting to apply "rational basis standards 
of equal protection review,"104 his standard was stricter than the 
minimum rationality test. Rather than assuming any conceivable 
state of facts that could justify the classification, Justice Powell 
would have required that the regulations "rationally serve some le-
gitimate articulated or obvious state interest."105 Further, instead of 
placing the burden on the challenger to show the lack of a rational 
basis, Powell would have plated the burden on the school board: 
The boards emphasize teacher absenteeism, classroom discipline, the 
safety of school children, and the safety of the expectant mother and 
her unborn child. No doubt these are legitimate concerns. But the 
boards have failed to demonstrate that these interests are in fact 
threatened by the continued employment of pregnant teachers.106 
Thus, Justice Powell, at least, would have been 'Willing to invoke the 
"newer" equal protection in the LaFleur situation. His means-focus 
is apparent from his conclusion: "I believe the linkage between the 
boards' legitimate ends and their chosen meaJ:?-S is too attenuated to 
support those portions of the regulations overturned by the Court."107 
In his concurrence with the Murry opinion, Justice Marshall sug-
gested an equal protection approach in which the interests involved 
in each case would be balanced in accordance with the "rudiments 
of fairness."108 In Justice Marshall's view, the Court "must assess the 
public and private interests affected by a statutory classification and 
then decide in each instance whether individualized determination 
is required or categorical treatment is permitted by the Constitu-
tion/'109 Under this cipptoach the 'weights given the cortfl.itting inter-
1s then possible for the reviewing court to conclude that the operative language con-
clusively presumes that the plaintiffs were not members of the class intended to be 
benefited. 
102. See Appendix at 89a-187a. 
103. Brief for Petitioners at 41-66 (Exhibit A). 
104. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4193. 
105. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4193 n.2. 
106. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4193 (emphasis added). 
107. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4193, 
108. 413 'u.S. at 519. 
109. 413 U.S. at 519. See also San Antonio indepertdent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 97-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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ests must ultimately rest on the subjective assessments of the decision-
maker; the approach may lack predictability and consistency, and 
may result in extensive policy-making by those least equipped to 
make such decisions. This approach may also allow vague, conclusory 
opinions, since no decision-making structure is imposed on courts; 
decisions may be obfuscated behind general "balancing" language. 
But balancing may have the advantage of requiring the Court to 
make explicit the policy choices it is now implicitly making under 
the "rationality" and "strict scrutiny" standards. While not without 
support,11° the balancing approach to equal protection does not ap-
pear to have the assent of a majority of the Court at present. 
II. DUE PROCESS: THE CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION APPROACH 
Perhaps the Court rejected an equal protection analysis because 
of the difficulty of reconciling a holding of unconstitutionality in 
Vlandis, Murry, and LaFleur with traditional equal protection prece-
dents. But the conclusive presumption doctrine, while serving as a 
safety valve to escape the rigidity of current equal protection doc-
trine, is not without substantial difficulties of its own. 
Under equal protection two established and two developing ap-
proaches exist with which to analyze problems of inequality.111 
Their formulations, to some extent even those of the newer ones, 
are fleshed out by a history of judicial decisions. The Supreme 
Court, instead of using the existing methods of analysis, adopted a 
highly questionable approach, with little help from counsel. 
A. Deprivation of "Life, Liberty or Property": The 
Threshold Issue 
The conclusive presumption doctrine has its source in the due 
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. While this 
issue received little attention in Vlandis, and none at all in Murry, 
the language of the Constitution requires that due process be af-
forded only where there is a deprivation of "life, liberty or prop-
110. Justice Marshall's concurrence in Murry was not joined by any of his colleagues. 
His dissent in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), was 
joined by Justice Douglas. However, Justice White appeared to support Justice Mar• 
shall's view in Vlandis. See 412 U.S. at 458-59. See also Karst, Legislative Facts in Con-
stitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REv. 75, 79-80; Comment, Fundamental Personal 
Rights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 807, 816 (1973); Note, 
Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842, 851-53 nn.39-40 (1969). 
111. Another questionable approach to problems of inequality has been the use of 
the bill of attainder clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. See, e.g., 
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 462 (1965) (White, J., dissenting). 
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erty."112 It is at least arguable that no such deprivation occurred 
in either Vlandis or Murry. (In LaFleur the Court found a depriva-
tion of "liberty."113) • 
It has recently been contended that "the clause applies whenever 
the state deals with an individual, so long as the interests threatened 
are not wholly frivolous."114 Moreover, the Court has itself suggested 
that the test is "state action that adjudicates important interests."115 
However, in the recent case of Board of Regents v. Roth,116 the 
Court gave substantive content to the concepts of "liberty" and 
"property" as used in the due process clauses. Roth involved the due 
process claim of a nontenured college teacher who had not been re-
hired at the conclusion of his one-year contract term. The college 
gave no reason for its failure to continue his employment, and the 
teacher, who believed that the reason was the exercise of his freedom 
of expression, demanded a due process hearing. The Court held the 
due process clause inapplicable since he had been deprived of 
neither liberty nor property. Conceding that the teacher's interest 
in continued employment may be an important one, the Court stated 
that "to determine whether the due process requirements apply in 
the first place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of 
the interest at stake."117 The Roth Court's discussion of the "prop-
erty" concept is of particular relevance to the Vlandis and Murry 
situations: 
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. 
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing 
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such 
as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and 
that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. Thus, the wel-
fare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly [397 U.S. 254 (1970)], had a claim 
of entitlement to welfare payments that was grounded in the statute 
defining eligibility for them. The recipients had not yet shown that 
they were, in fact, within the statutory terms of eligibility. But we 
held that they had a right to a hearing at which they might attempt 
to do so.118 
112. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). See also O'Neil, Of Justice 
Delayed and Justice Denied: The Welfare Prior Hearing Cases, 1970 SUP. Cr. REv. 
161, 178-79. 
113. See text accompanying note 88 supra. 
114. Comment, Segregation of Poor and Minority Children into Classes for the Men-
tally Retarded by the Use of IQ Tests, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1212, 1226 (1973)._ 
ll5. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 
89 (1972). 
116. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
117. 408 U.S. at 570-71 (emphasis original). 
118. 408 U.S. at 577. 
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This reasoning would indicate that there was no deprivation of 
"property" in Vlandis or Murry. However, the appellees in Vlandis 
argued that they were deprived of property "through increased tui-
tion charges/'110 and the Court apparently accepted this argument, 
stating that the "statute operated to deprive them of a significant 
amount of their money without due process of law."120 
A more accurate description of the Vlandis situation would be 
that the state failed to accord the appellees the degree of educational 
subsidy that it granted to statutory residents. Viewed in this light, 
the issue is whether appellees had a property interest in this state 
subsidy. According to Roth, "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's pro-
cedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of inter-
ests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits . • . . To 
have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have 
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must, instead, have a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to it."121 
Unlike the plaintiffs in Goldberg v. Kelly,122 who "had a claim of 
entitlement to welfare payments that was grounded in the statute 
defining eligibility for them," the Vlandis plaintiffs made no claim 
to statutory entitlement. Rather, they freely admitted that, under 
the terms of the statute, they were classified as nonresidents. The 
statute itself, therefore, conferred no property right. 
Looking to the "purpose" rather than the letter of the statute, 
it could be argued that there was an "understanding" that all 
persons with domiciliary intent should receive the resident-tuition 
subsidy. Plaintiffs might claim a property interest derived from this 
understanding. However, this interpretation of the legislative pur-
pose would be closer to a "unilateral expectation" than to an "under-
standing." Because 0£ the fluidity with which statutory purposes may 
be manipulated,123 they provide a rather unstable basis £tom which 
to derive a property interest. For example, it seems plain £-rotn the 
language and effect of the Connecticut statute that its purpose was 
not to provide a resident-tuition subsidy to all persons with domicili-
ary intent, but rather to provide the subsidy to most of those per-
sons, to the extent that they could be ascertained with a minimum of 
administrative expense. If this was the purpose of the statute, then 
the legislative "understanding" included the possibility that some 
persons, including the appellees, would not receive the benefit de-
spite theit actual domiciliary intent. 
119. Brief for Appellees at 53. 
120. 412 U.S. at 452. 
121. 408 U.S. at 576-77. 
122. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
123. See Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Ftotectidn, SJ? YAtE L.J. 
123, 132 (1972). 
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Turning to Murry, the Court's opinion nowhere mentions the 
property deprivation requirement, possibly because the issue was not 
raised by the government. In addition, the appellees did not attempt 
to show a deprivation df "property," but me't'ely asserted that "(p)rb-
cedural due process is applicable whenever govetnmental action de-
nies or terminates an individual's rights br benefi.ts."124 But, as in 
Vlandis, the plaintiffs admitted that they were ineligible for benefits 
under the statute. Indeed, such ineligibility was a necessary element 
of their constitutional challenge. If, as the government argtied,125 
they were actually eligible for food stamps, they wduld have had no 
standing to challenge the substance of the statute.126 
As in Vlandis, a basis for a daim. of entitlement could be the 
purpose of the statute. One source for a purpose is the Fodd Stamp 
Act's "[c]ongressiohal declaration of policy," which states that the 
objective is to "raise leve1s of httttitfon among low-ihcome house-
holds.''127 But this objective can be achieved without providing food 
stamps to all heedy households. Another pbssible source of the statu-
tory purpose is the provision for eligibility standards, which ate de-
signed to limit the program "to those households whose income and 
other financial resources are determined to be substantial limiting 
factors in permitting them to purchase a nutritionally adequate 
diet,"128 Bt'lt this proVisioi:l is, at least on its face, an "understand-
ing" only that households with sufficient resources should not get 
food stamps. Only by negative inference cat1 it be said that house-
holds with insufficient income shdUld get relief, and another l11rge 
step is required to find a congressional intent that all such house-
holds should get relief. Again, Congress may well have been content 
to reach most such households. 
If the appellees in Vlandis and Murry could take little comfort 
in either the express language of the statutes ot in their legislative 
purpdses, an additional source of an "understanding" on which to 
base a property right might be the equal protection clause. Thus, 
the ::tppellees might argrte that the equal protection clause guaran-
tees that all persons similarly situated will receive similar behefi.ts; 
therefore, if others sufficiently like them were giveh food stanlps or 
a higher tuition subsidy, there was hti understanding that the appel-
~ . ~ . 
124. Brief for Appellees at 62 n. •. 
1 
125. Brief for Appellants at 5-6 n.3, See also 413 U.S. at 521-22 (Black.mun, J., dis-
senting). 
126. 1f they were eligible under the statute, plaintiffs could not claim they were 
personally "aggrieved in fact" by the substance of the statute. See Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Rathel', their injury would stem from an hnptoper adminis• 
trative application. 
127. 7 u.s.c. § 2011 (1970). 
128. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) (1970). 
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lees should have these benefits as well. To the extent that the equal 
protection clause and the concept of equality implicit in the fifth 
amendment place a duty on the state and federal governments to 
act equitably in their distributive roles,129 there is a correlative right 
in the citizenry to these benefits. 
There may be three problems with this argument. First, there is 
the Roth Court's statement that "[p]roperty interests ... are not 
created by the Constitution."180 This statement, however, refers to 
the due process clause and appears to stand only for the proposition 
that procedural due process, by itself, does not create rights but 
merely protects already existing rights. The right to equal treatment 
in disbursements of governmental benefits would be an already 
existing right. 
Second, the Court has often recognized that the equal protection 
clause does not demand "mathematical nicety" in apportioning social 
benefits.131 However, it would seem that any deviation from equality 
would be a deprivation. The question of whether it was justified, due, 
for example, to administrative convenience or the difficulty in struc-
turing precise classifications, would be resolved in determining 
whether the denial of the property interest was justified. 
The third criticism of this approach seems more serious than the 
others. If these cases are to be analyzed in part under the equal pro-
tection clause, it is conceptually cleaner to approach them in terms 
of the already established equal protection doctrine, which has grad-
ually developed to deal with problems of equal treatment, rather 
than by a circuitous route through the due process clause. 
An application of the concept of equality might also lend itself 
to classifying the interest involved as "liberty." The due process 
clause does protect liberties, and liberties are created by the consti-
tution. One of the great liberties in any just society is a right to 
equal treatment in governmental disbursements of benefits and lia-
bilities.132 But, again, a procedural due process approach seems inap-
propriate, as there is a time-tested method for dealing with this 
problem-the equal protection concept. 
Another possible interpretation of Vlandis and Murry is that they 
indeed stand for the proposition that due process is required when-
ever the state deals with an individual so long as the interests threat-
ened are not wholly frivolous. This would erode Roth and, like the 
application of equality concepts, significantly expand the definition of 
"life, liberty, or property" for due process purposes. Prior due process 
129. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62, 303 (1971). 
130. 408 U.S. at 577. 
131. E.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). 
132. J. RAWLS, supra note 129, at 62, 303. 
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cases have involved deprivations in the sense of taking a person's 
life,133 taking away some form of liberty,134 taking away something 
the individual had privately acquired, 135 ·withdrawal of governmental 
benefits from persons who claimed statutory entitlement, 186 or sus-
pension of a governmental privilege already acquired.137 LaFleur is 
not greatly different from these cases, but Vlandis and Murry appear 
to be the first cases in which the Court has held the due process 
clause applicable to the failure to confer governmental benefits on 
individuals who admittedly had no entitlement under the terms of 
the statute.138 This significant expansion of due process protection, 
unfortunately, ·was made without the help of briefs on the issue and 
was never directly addressed in the opinions. 
B. The Procedure-Substance Distinction 
Due process cases are conventionally divided into "procedural" 
and "substantive" cases.139 The two approaches are distinguishable 
in three important respects. 
First, there is a difference in function. Procedural due process 
typically deals with the enforcement of public policy as determined 
by the legislature and expressed by statute.140 It requires that per-
sons who are deprived of life, liberty, or property by the law be 
given reasonable notice and a fair hearing.141 It is basically a guaran-
tee against arbitrary exertions of executive and judicial power.142 
Substantive due process, on the other hand, functions as a check on 
the legislative formulation of policy and calls into question the em-
133. E.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (death penalty). 
134. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incarceration). 
135. E.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (custody of children); Heiner v. 
Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) (ta.xation). 
136. E.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (teacher's employment); Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits). 
137. E.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (driver's license). 
138. This statement may not be strictly accurate if Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618 (1969), is taken into account. While decided according to the equal protection strict 
scrutiny standard, Shapiro involved due process to the extent that a District of Colum-
bia provision was invalidated, since equal protection is applicable to the federal gov-
ernment only by way of the fifth amendment due process clause. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497 (1954). But the Court clearly considered Shapiro an equal protection rather 
than a due process case, and, in addition, the statute was held to impinge upon the 
right to travel, so that a deprivation of "liberty" was involved. 
139. A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 233 (1962). 
140. Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1048, 
1064-65 (1968). 
141. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-62, 267-71 (1970). 
142. P. KAUPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 601 (4th ed. 1972). 
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pirical basis for, or the propriety of adopting, certain measures. 
Thus, it guarantees against arbitrary exertions of legislative power.148 
Second, there is a difference in compatibility with the judicial 
role. Since courts have daily experience with the conduct of trials 
and the administration of justice, the setting of procedural standards 
is within the judicial sphere of competence, and decisions in this 
area may more readily receive public acceptance.144 Judicial intru-
sions into the substantive policy-making atea, on the other hand, are 
likely to be viewed as disregard for the separation of judicial and 
legislative functions.145 This separation of powers is fundamental to 
a majoritarian system of government, which assumes that it is pref-
erable to have policy set by elected and responsible legislators rather 
than by appointed judges.146 In addition, policy-making in the legis-
lative halls allows for a greater input by different societal factions 
than does decision-making in judicial chambers. There is also a 
practical advantage: Legislatures may have superior institutional 
provision for factual input on broad policy questions.147 
Third, as a consequence of the above two differences, there has 
developed a difference in standard of review. In procedural due 
process cases the Coutt has openly espoused a balancing test. For 
example, the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly formulated the test as 
follows: "The extent to which procedural due process must be af-
forded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be 
'condemned to suffer grievous loss,' . . . and depends upon whether 
the recipient's interest ih avoiding that loss outweighs the govern-
mental interest in summary adjudication.''148 While a balancing test 
was once in vogue in substantive due process cases as well,140 the 
Court more recently has left the balancing of policy considerations 
to the legislative branch, adopting a substantive due process stan-
143. A. BICKEL, supra note 139, at 233. 
144. Rather, supra note 140, at 1064-65. 
145. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-32 (1963). See also Ratner, supra note 140, 
at 1063. 
146. A. BICKEL, supra note 139, at 18-20. See also Commager, Judicial Review and 
Democracy, in JUDICIAL :REvmw AND THE SUI'REME CoURT 64, 72-73 (L. Levy ed. 1967). 
147. Oregon v. Mitchell, 4<10 U.S. 112, 241-48 (1970) (Brennan, J.); P. Brest, Processes 
of Constitutional Adjudication 5.20-.24 (Tent. Draft, Nov. 1972); Wellington, Common 
1.aw Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 
YALE L.J. 221, 266 (1973) ("['I]he Court is not well-suited to the development of poli• 
cles.'). 
148, 397 U.S, at 262·63. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, ll78 (1971): 
"The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon 
the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings." 
149. See Comment, supra note HO, at 807: "The pre-1937 Court's approach to inter• 
preting the vague provisions of the due process clauses may best be characterized as a 
'balancing' of the burden imposed on a person's life, liberty or property by govern• 
mental regulation against the governtnental justifications for the burdens." See also 
Ratner, $Uprd note 140, at 1071. 
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<lard of extreme deference to the Iegislatures150 and actively reviewing 
only legislation dealing "With the right of privacy.161 As with two-
tiered equal protection, this approach is a recognition of the judi-
ciary's limited competence in dealing with broad social and. eco-
nomic policy considerations.162 
The appellees in Vlandis and Murry clearly couched their due 
process arguments in procedural terms.163 In Murry, the appellees 
argued that "a conclusive statutory presumption, that may be er-
roneous, and adversely affects the rights of persons, is violative of 
procedural due process."154 In Vlandis, the a.ppellees claimed that 
"[t]he deprivation of a state provided entitlement such as education 
must be accompanied by the procedural due process required by 
the Fourteenth .Amendment."155 
The Court in each case simply referred to "due process," omit-
ting a label of either substantive or prbcedural. In certaih respects, 
however, the Court employed a procedural analysis. ¥ or ex.ample, 
the cases cited are primarily procedural.166 Furthermore, the very 
term "conclusive presumption" suggests that the cases turn on a 
matter of procedure, as does the following language from the Vlandis 
opinion: "[S]tandards of due process require that the State allow 
such an individual the opportunity to present evidence showing that 
he is a bona fide resident entitled to the in-state rates.''157 And Jus-
tice Marshall, in his Vlandis concurrence, stated that the case con-
cerned "nothing more than the procedures by which the State de-
termines whether or not a person is a resident for tuition pur-
poses."158 
Yet, despite this language of procedure, other language used by 
the Court is more reminiscent of the substantive rational relation 
150. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
151. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965). 
152. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); authorities cited in note 147 supra. 
153. No due process claim was made in LaFleur. See note 53 supra. The LaFleur 
respondents did use the phrase "irrebuttable presumption" in their brief, see Brief 
for Respondents at 51, but not in connection with a due process argumertt. 011 the 
government side in Vlandis and Murry, the due process issue was either whoily ignored 
or casually dealt with in a few paragraphs. See notes 26 &: 41 supra. In Murry, for 
example, the government dismissed the due process argument as "nothing more than 
a restated equal protection argument in disguise." Reply Brief for Appellants at 10. 
154. Brief for Appellees at 65. 
155. Brief for Appellees at 57. 
156. The Court relied both iii. Vlandis, see 412 U.S. at 446, 451, and in Murry, see 
413 U.S. at 513-14, on such cases as Bell v. Btmon, 402 U.S. 53_5 (1971), and Stanley v. 
lliinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), both of which have been referred to elsewhere by the 
Court as procedural due process cases. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. !i64, 
!i72 nn.10-11 (1972). 
157. 412 U.S. at 452 (emphasis added). 
158. 412 U.S. at 4!i!i (emphasis added). 
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test than of the procedural balancing standard. In Vlandis, the 
Court characterized the statute involved as "wholly unrelated"lllo to 
the state's objective and as "arbitrary."160 In Murry, the statutory 
provision was said to have "no relation"161 to its purpose of deter-
mining need and not to be a "rational measure"162 of a household's 
need. Thus, the opinions lack the internal consistency necessary to 
classify the Court's approach as either procedural or substantive due 
process. 
The Vlandis and Murry cases appear in fact to be purely sub-
stantive in nature. First, the appellees admitted that the relevant 
statutory provisions had been properly applied. Rather than chal-
lenging the procedures of application, they, in effect, challenged the 
legislative fact-finding and demanded that new issues be made rele-
vant.163 In essence, the Court required that the states extend benefits 
to those in the appellees' class; in procedural cases the Court does 
not expand the class of people entitled to receive the benefit but 
only deals with what procedures are necessary when affecting that 
interest. 
Second, to the extent that it was the policy of the legislature to 
further administrative values by narrowly defining the relevant is-
sues, the Vlandis and Murry decisions were substantive in their con-
clusion that a more closely tailored selection process outweighed the 
policies of consistency, predictability, economy, and convenience. 
In sum, the Vlandis and Murry opinions generated a degree of 
analytic confusion by their failure to distinguish between procedural 
and substantive due process. While the opinions were framed in 
language suggesting procedure (for example, "conclusive presump-
tion"), the basic issue was one of substantive policy. Further, the 
Court employed language suggesting a "rational relation" standard, 
which has been associated in recent cases with substantive, but not 
procedural, due process. 
Dissenting in both Vlandis and Murry, Justice Rehnquist char-
159. 412 U.S. at 441, 449, 450. 
160. 412 U.S. at 450. 
161. 413 U.S. at 508, 514. 
162. 413 U.S. at 508, 514. 
163. 413 U.S. at 508, 514. In Murry, for example, appellees argued that "the ta.\: 
dependency provision was enacted because Congress presumed that any household con-
taining a member who had been claimed as a 'tax dependent' for the prior year-lmd 
sufficient current income and resources 'to purchase a nutritionally adequate diet. • .' " 
Brief for Appellees at 58. They proceeded to argue that this presumption was "very 
frequently erroneous," id. at 60, and demanded that they be permitted to demonstrate 
"that adequate food resources are not available to them," id. at 71, charging, in effect, 
that Congress had made the wrong issue relevant to its objective of determining need. 
Similarly, the appellees in Vlandis urged that the legislature had omitted a signifi-
cant issue: "The statutory scheme in this case excludes the important factor of resi-
dency from the state's determination to deprive or grant the state provided entitlement 
in issue [i.e., the instate tuition subsidy]." Brief for Appcllees at 51. 
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acterized the cases as examples of substantive due process in the 
now-discredited164 sense of the term.165 The judicial role connoted 
by "substantive due process" is illustrated in such pre-1937 cases as 
Lochner v. New York166 and Coppage v. Kansas.161 In Lochner, the 
Court held a New York statute that limited employment in bakeries 
to a maximum of sixty hours per week and ten hours per day to be 
an unconstitutional denial of liberty of contract under the due pro-
cess clause. In Coppage, the Court struck do-wn on similar grounds a 
Kansas statute outlawing "yellow dog" contracts-labor contracts 
that made refraining from joining a union a condition of employ-
ment. These cases and others of their era involved a judicial assess-
ment of the social or economic wisdom of particular governmental 
regulation of business within the context of a Constitution assumed 
to embody the principle of laissez-faire and to imply a very active 
policy-making function for the Court.168 
An analogous judicial role in Vlandis or Murry would seem to 
require greater intrusions into the policy sphere than in fact took 
place. In these cases, the Court did not intrude into the legislative 
decisions to grant a higher tuition subsidy to residents than to non-
residents, and to operate a food-stamp program for needy households. 
The extent of the Court's substantive intrusion was to dictate that 
the purpose be to reach all similarly situated beneficiaries, not just 
most, as the legislature prol;>ably intended, and to require that 
greater administrative expense be allowed if necessary to, effectuate 
this goal more accurately. In fact, the Court held the basic goal so 
important that it required it to be even more accurately carried out 
than the legislature intended. As the Court was only finely tuning 
the distribution mechanism, not reassessing the total program, J us-
tice Rehnquist's comparison of these cases with the "substantive due 
process" era may be s<;>mewhat exa:ggerated. 
C. Means Orientation 
Nevertheless, the Court's substantive role in Vlandis, LaFleur, 
and Murry is not without some difficulty. If the Court's "rational 
164. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1972); Wellington, supra note 147, at 280. 
165. In Vlandis, he stated that the decision "harks back to a day when the principles 
of substantive due process had reached their zenith in this Court." 412 U.S. at 467-68. In 
Murry, he disputed the Court's procedural "conclusive presumption" analysis: "There 
is a qualitative difference between, on the one hand, holding unconstitutional on pro-
cedural due process grounds presumptions which conclude factual inquiries without a 
hearing • • • , and, on the other hand, holding unconstitutional a duly enacted pro-
phylactic limitation on the dispens~tion of funds which is designed to cure systemic 
abuses." 413 U.S. at 524. 
166. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
167. 236 U.S. 1 (1915). 
168. See Ratner, supra note 140, at 1071. 
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relation" language was intended to imply that the modern, deferen-
tial, substantive due process standard as formulated in such cases 
as Ferguson v. Skruptt169 was being applied, then that standard has 
been given new teeth in the instant cases. The judicial deference 
that the Ferguson standard embodies is markedly lacking. As Justice 
Rehnquist stated with regard to the Murry decision: "To be sure, 
there tnay be no perfect correlation between the fact that the tax-
payer is part of a household which has income exceeding food stamp 
eligibility standards and his provision of enough support to raise his 
dependent's household above such standards. But there is some cor-
relation, and the provision is, therefore1 not ittational."170 
The Vlandis, LaFleur, and Mitr-ty decisions may represent a mid-
dle ground betweeh the "old" substantive due process of the Lochner 
era and the "new" substahtive due process 0£ the Ferguson variety. 
While the wisdom of the bMic legislative policy was not challenged, 
the accuracy of the means adopted to effectuate that policy was held 
inadequate. Thus, the instant cases may parallel, in the due process 
area, the "means-focused" standard that Professor Gunther has per-
ceived in recent equal protection cases.171 
Any means-focused approach has substantial problems, however. 
It presupposes that a reasonably dear ends/means distinction can be 
drawn, specifically, that it is 'ptlssible to identify the legislative "pur-
pose" and then independently judge the rationality of the mearts em-
ployed to put that purpose into effect. If the purpose 0£ any statute is 
taken to be coextensive with its language or practical effect, then 
ends and means merge, and the legislation is by definition perfectly 
"rational." Only if a purpose is imputed to the legislature beyond 
the face of itS statute can the issue of the rationality of the means 
have any relevance. Yet, OI1ce this stage of imputing a purpose is 
reached, the Court can define it in such a way that practically any 
degree of "rationality'' can be achieved. Was the purpose in Vlandis, 
for example, to grant a higher tuition subsidy to all students with 
domiciliary intent, as the Court apparently assumed, or was it to 
reach as many such students as possible, consisteht with an easily ad-
ministered standard, or was it to subsidize only the narrow class of 
students with substantial relationships with the state? All have some 
plausibility, yet the first "purpose" would obviously make the Stan-
dard adopted appear less rational than the others. 
A second problem ·with the means-focused approach, as noted 
earlier, is the necessity of empiric, "legislative" fact-finding by the 
Court. Thus, i£ the Court in Vlandis decided that the legislature's 
purpose was to _grant higher tuition subsidies to all students ·with 
169. 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
170. 413 U.S. at 525. 
171. See Gunther, supra note 98, at 26-30. 
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domiciliary intent, it would ~till have to determine whether the 
statutory definition of nonresident as one whose address wa~ QU~ide 
the state at the time of application "sqbstantially furthered" that 
purpose. Statistical dat;i would be required to determine whether the 
vast majority of Ol,lt-of-&tat~ applicants lacked domiciliary intent and 
continued to lack domiciliciry intent throughoqt their attendance at 
the university. I£ so, then the statutory means would presumably pe 
"rational." 
Such data were, of cot1rse, not available to the Court in. Vl(lndi$. 
Perhaps for this reason the Court appeared to demand perfect con-
gruence between the statutory classification and the legii;lative pur-
pose it was designed to effectuate, holding the classifkation "irra-
tional" since it was not; "necessarily ot 11niver11ally true in fact,"1n A. 
mt:!ans-foc1.1sed approach with such a strict standard of "ratio11ality'1 
raises problems of practical government. As Profe~sor Brest has ob-
served, "[T]o refuse to allow departures £row. congruence to l>e j-11~ti-
fi.ed in terms of efficiency . • , would increase the co:;ts of govern-
mental regulation so as to price most regulation out of existence."17a 
A final problem with the :;trkt :roeans-focu:;ed approad:i is that 
legislators draft J;:,ills within budgetary c.onstraints, The operative, 
classificatory language is often an attempt to strU<.e a bal~i:;e 1;,e~veep. 
those whom. the legislators feel the state can afford to benefit an,d all 
those who may possibly or marginally de~erve som~ help. The 11se <;>~ 
broad classifications is a tool for accomplishing tnis goal. A reviewing 
court is, of course, under no such con:;traint and m.ay fail to con~ 
sider the state's bu,dgetary problems, 
D. Analytical Difficulties 
Perhaps the most serious defect in the conclustve presumption 
doctrine is that it rests upon a disingen{lous, :misleading analysis. lt 
has long been recqg11ized that there cannot be a, c;9nclt1siv~ "pre-
sumption," at least if the term is used to refe:i; to an evidentiary h11r .. 
den-shifting d.evice.174 When a statute provides that ce:ftfl.i:Jl con~e-
quences shall flow from fact A and then provides that froJil proof of 
fact B the existence of fact A shall be. conclusively pre.~u,med, tl!e 
practical effect is to make fact A irrelevant. The same result would 
be achieved by making the statutory consequences turn directly on 
fact B. The only genuine constitutional questio11- in this sitt1-ation 
is whether it is permissible to de:i;i,ve the given consequences from 
172. 41~ U.S. at 45~. 
173. P. Brest, supra note 147, at 5.63. 
174. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2492 (3d ed. 1940). See also Brosman, The Statutory 
Presumption, 5 TULANE L. REv. 17, 24 (1930); Keeton, Statutory Presumptions-Their 
Constitutionality and Legal Effect, IO TEXAS L. REv. 34 (1931). 
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fact B. A procedural due process claim based upon a supposed right 
to present evidence of fact A is no more warranted than a claim 
concerning any other irrelevant issue. While it might be esthetically 
more pleasing for the legislature to say what it means-formulating 
the provision directly in terms of fact B, instead of resorting to the 
fiction of a conclusive presumption-this stylistic flaw violates no 
one's procedural rights. 
Two early cases in which the conclusive presumption doctrine 
was invoked involved at least this statutory cosmetic defect. Schlesin-
ger v. Wisconsin175 and Heiner v. Donnan116 dealt with provisions 
for the taxation of gifts that conclusively presumed that gifts made 
within a certain fixed period177 prior to the donor's death were made 
"in contemplation of death.'' Fact A in these statutes was the intent 
of the donor to give in contemplation of death. Fact B was the com-
pletion of the gift within the statutory period before death. The 
practical effect was to impose tax at a certain rate upon all gifts made 
within the statutory period. The actual donative intent was made 
irrelevant. 
The real constitutional issue in these cases was whether it was 
permissible to impose a tax upon all gifts made within a certain 
period regardless of the donor's intent, when the legislative purpose 
was to eliminate estate tax .evasion in the form of de facto testa-
mentary gifts disguised as inter vivos transfers. The statutes did, of 
course, create overinclusive burdening classifications to the extent 
that some gifts made within the statutory period were genuine inter 
vivos gifts, that would otherwise be taxed at a lower rate or not taxed 
at all. Thus, an equal protection argument could have been made, 
through with little chance of success under the then-prevailing stan-
dard.11s 
The Heiner Court, however, saw the issue as that of a litigant's 
"right to prove the facts of his case.''170 The Court failed to ex-
plain how facts irrelevant under the statute could be considered "the 
facts of his case" and asserted merely that "whether the [conclusive] 
presumption be treated as a rule of evidence or of substantive law, it 
constitutes an attempt, by legislative fiat, to enact into existence a 
fact which here does not, and cannot be made to, exist in actual-
175. 270 U.S. 230 (1926) (McReynolds, J.). 
176. 285 U.S. 312 (1932) (Sutherland, J.). 
177. In Schlesinger, the period was six years; in Heiner, two years, 
178. The Court had held in 1911 that "[a] classification having some reasonable basis 
does not offend [the equal protection] clause merely because it is not made with mathe• 
matical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality," and that "if any 
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that 
state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed." Lindsley v. Natural 
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). 
179. 285 U.S. at 329. 
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ity .•.. "180 The reasoning of the Heiner case has been severely 
criticized by Professor Morgan, who remarked that "[i]t would re-
quire very efficient mental blinders . . . to conceal from the intel-
lectual vision the very evident purpose of the enactment to impose 
a tax upon all gifts made within two years of the death of the 
donor."181 
If the conclusive presumption analysis was inappropriate in 
Schlesinger and Heiner, it was even less appropriate in Vlandis, 
Murry, and LaFleur. The tax statutes in the earlier cases at least 
appeared on a superficial reading to make one fact relevant and then 
foreclose the taking of evidence on that fact. In contrast, the provi-
sions in the instant cases were ·written directly in terms of the opera-
tive fact B, to continue the abstract example. Fact A is only to be 
found in the hypothetical purpose of the statutes. It is difficult to 
find anything resembling a "conclusive presumption" in the language 
of either the Connecticut tuition statute, the tax dependency amend-
ment to the Food Stamp Act, or the maternity leave rule. Thus, in 
Vlandis the Court found the legislative purpose to be to charge 
higher tuition to nonresidents, and the Connecticut legislature was 
said to have conclusively presumed that all out-of-state applicants 
were and remained nonresidents. In Murry, the Court found the 
purpose to be to provide food stamps to all needy households, and 
Congresss was said to have conclusively presumed that all tax-de-
pendent households were not needy. In LaFleur, the Court found the 
purpose to be to grant leave to disabled teachers, and the school 
board was said to have conclusively presumed that all women more 
than four-months pregnant were incapable of teaching. 
. On this analysis, of course, every statute could be said to pre-
sume conclusively that its classification is accurate in light of its 
purpose in every case. Some examples of how widely this conclusive 
presumption analysis could be applied will be examined in the next 
section. But it might be wrong to suppose that the Court is misled 
by its own analysis. That the conclusive presumption doctrine fulfills 
a particular need can be seen by viewing the cases in which it has 
been applied. 
The conclusive presumption doctrine has been applied exclusively 
in cases that involved overinclusive burdening classifications.182 This 
means that all of the cases were amenable to an equal protection 
analysis. Yet, with two exceptions,183 none was expressly decided on 
180. 285 U.S. at 329. 
181. Morgan, Federal Constitutional Limitations upon Presumptions Created by 
State Legislation, in HARVARD LEGAL EssAYS 323, 329 (1934). 
182. See cases in notes 1-2, 4, 6-10 supra. 
183. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). 
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equal protection grounds, perhaps because equal protection prece-
dent would have led to sustaining the legislation. 
The Court was not disposed to sustain the legislation, as the 
results in the conclusive presumption cases demonstrate. One pos-
sible explanation is that most of the cases have involved burdens 
that worked a particular hardship on the individuals involved. Thus, 
in Stanley v, Jllinois,18i q :futher's children were taken away; in ]Jell 
v. }]urson,186 a tr,weling country parson's d1;iver'~ license was SUS• 
pended; in Murry~ impoverished households were denied food stamp 
relief; and in LaFleur, teachers were required to take unpaid leave. 
The hardship natµre of these cases may have eJD.phasized the need 
for an escape from 1;igid equal protection doctrine. This way of 
limiting the cases seems reasonable as statutes dealing with impor-
tant personal interests should be precisely drawn. It does not, how-
ever, explain Vlandis, which does not appear to deal with similar 
hardship. 
E. An Appraisal of the Technique 
If the doctrine is to be manageable any future use must be 
limited to its past role as a hardship exception to established equa] 
protection precedent.186 The Vlandis opinion, however, implies that 
a "permanent and irrebuttable presumption," that is, a statutory 
classification, !llight be unconstitutional whenever "that presump-
tion is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State 
has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determina-
tion."181 If this language is taken at face value, the doctrine may be 
widely applicable indeed, for the statutory presumptio:n that is 
"necessarily or universally true in fact" is extremely rare. And, if 
the means available to the state for a case-by-case determination of 
college students' domiciliary intent are "reasonable," then it would 
seem that no issue of fact would pose too great an administrative 
burden under the Vlandis standard. Chief Justice Burger marshalled 
a parade of horribles: 
[L ]iterally thousands of state statutes create classifications permanent 
. in duration, which are less than perfect, as all legislative classifica-
tions are, and might be improved on by individualized determina-
tions so as to avoid the untoward results produced here due to the 
184, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
185. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). 
186. See Mourning v. Family Publications Servs., Inc., 411 U.S, 356 (1973), in wblch 
the Court rejected a conclusive presumption challenge to a Federal Reserve Board regu• 
lation that provided for disclosure of finance charges in any consumer sale payable in 
more than four installments. The challenger, a large corporation, was threatened by 
no hardship. 
187. 412 U.S. at 452. 
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very unusual facts of this case. Both the anomaly present here and 
the argu.ible alternative~ to it do not di{fer fro:,;n those present whe,:i, 
for example, a State provides that a person may not be licen~ed to 
practice medicine or law unless he or she is a graduate of an. accred-
ited professional graduate sc;:hool; a perfectly capable practitionei.-
may as a consequence be barred "permanently an,d irrebuttably" 
fro:,;n pursuing his calling, without ever having an opportunity to 
prove his pei;-sonal s~1s.1sa 
One example of a statute amenable to "conclusive pre1mmption" 
analysis would be t;he debt-ac;1.justing law upheld in Ferguson v. 
Skrupa.189 The K~sas legislature had precluded laymen frn:i;n. the 
business of debt-adjusting, ~though lawyer& were not &o p:reduded,111° 
on the presumption that "fiuancially distress<;d debto1;~ require 'd~bt 
adjustment' services and advice which no layma;n, . , . lioweve:r 
honest, can possibly supply.''191 Pespite thfa conclusive presuwption 
that no om: who had not been <!.dmitted to the bar was competent 
tQ engage in debt-adjusting, the Supreme Court sustained the statute 
against both due proces~ and equal protection challenges, :itating 
that it had "retur;ned to the original constit11tional proposition that 
courts do not substitute their social and economic be}iefs for the 
judgment of le~lative bodies, wh9 a:re electe;:d. to pass laws,"192 Yet, 
under the Vlandis standard, this statutory presmllption see:p:is far 
from "universally or necessarily true in fact," since :many experi~ 
enced debt adjustors surely have as m1,1ch competence to engage in 
that business as the average lawyer. Moreover, "reasonable alterna-
tive means" are available to the state in the form of licensing and 
regulation of the debt-adjusting trade, Sine~ c<:>mpetence tQ engage 
in debt-adjusting could be m.easu,red by objective tests, it would 
seem easier to determine than a college student's domiciliary intent. 
In terms of the individual impact, the jfi.dividuals who were forced 
to give up their livelihood by the Kansas smtute surely suffered 
greater hardship than the Vlandis appellees, who paid higher tµition 
rates but were able to remain in school and did receive some state 
subsidy. As Justice Rehnquist stated in his Vlandis dissent: "The 
Court's highly abstract and theoretical analysis of this practical 
problem leads to a conclusion that is contrary to the teaching of 
Ferguson . . • .''193 
The conclusive presumption analysis can also be applied to in-
188. 412 U.S. at 462. 
189. 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
190, Act of June 30, 1961, ch. 190, § 1, [1961] Kansas Laws 378, repealed by Act of 
April 23, 1969, ch. 180, § 21-4701, [1969l Kansas Laws 503, 
191, Brief for Appellant Sanborn at ll, 
192. 372 '(J.S, at 7/l0. 
193. 412 U.S. at 468. 
832 Michigan Law Review [Vol. '72:800 
come cut-offs for welfare eligibility. For example, at the time of 
Murry a federal regulation precluded five-member households with 
income over 440 dollars per month from receiving food stamps.104 
It was thus conclusively pre~umed that such households had sufficient 
income to purchase a nutritionally adequate diet. Yet, a five-member 
household with income of 450 dollars per month could claim that, 
due to special dietary requirements, this presumption was not "nec-
essarily true in fact." Under Vlandis and Murry, the household 
would appear to have a constitutional right to a due process hearing 
on its actual need.195 There might seem to be little additional ad-
ministrative burden in making an exception to the strict income 
cut-off for individual circumstances such as special dietary require-
ments. Yet, once exceptions to this "bright line" statute are per-
mitted, it would be difficult to limit their scope. Eventually, it 
would be necessary to consider the entire range of special individual 
circumstances, until the actual food needs of each household were 
determined. One obvious example would be the age, size, sex, and 
other factors influencing the caloric intake of each child in the 
household. There is certainly a difference between a "five-member 
household" with one adult and four pre-school children and a 
household with two adults and three teen-age boys. Yet, under the 
food stamp program, both households are conclusively presumed to 
have the same level of need if they have the same income. 
Another example of the kind of statute susceptible of conclusive 
presumption analysis is the traffic speed limit. The purpose behind 
a speed limit is usually to help ensure safe driving; if a speed limit 
is set at 25 miles per hour on a certain street, it is thus conclusively 
presumed that driving above that speed is unsafe.196 The ticketed 
driver will assuredly not be heard to argue that, while he was driv-
ing at 35 miles per hour, he<iwas driving safely under the prevailing 
194. 37 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1972). 
195. Indeed, a very similar example was used by the government in Murry in oppo• 
sition to appellees' motion for a temporary restraining order in federal district court: 
"There are a lot of people in the country, I think, who may or may not be needy, to 
whom food stamp relief is not available • • • • Who is to say $400 is enough, as opposed 
to $399 a month? That one dollar does not make the difference between being needy 
or not. Congress has to make limits." Oral argument before Gesell, J., Hearing on 
:Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, July 19, 1972, quoted in Brief for Appellees 
at B-10. 
196. 'That this example is not as far-fetched as it first appears is shown by the case 
of O'Donnell v. Wells, 323 Mo. 1170, 21 S.W.2d 762 (1929), in which an ordinance de• 
dared that a rate of speed in excess of 25 miles per hour for a distance of one city 
block should be considered proof of driving at a rate of speed that was not careful or 
prudent. The Missouri supreme court struck down that ordinance under the conclusive 
presumption doctrine and held that, while the legislature may provide that proof of a 
certain character shall be prima facie evidence of a fact sought to be established, it can-
not prescribe what shall be conclusive evidence of that fact. While the court asserted 
that the ordinance "does not fix a speed limit," 323 l\fo. at 1179, 21 S.W.2d at 766, it 
is difficult to perceive more than a semantic distinction. 
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conditions. But this argument seems perfectly consisten~ with the 
rationale of Vlandis and Murry, and, if that rationale were widely 
applied, every speed limit in the United States would be unconsti-
tutional. A "reasonable alternative" to speed limits is available-
leaving the assessment of whether certain driving is unsafe to the 
discretion of the traffic policeman. Another possibility is to make 
speeding only prima facie evidence of unsafe driving and, therefore, 
permit the driver to introduce evidence that he was driving safely. 
Moreover, since a certain number of speeding convictions can 
result in the suspension of one's driver's license, the individual im-
pact is similar to that involved in the Bell case. 
A final example from among the "literally thousands" of statutes 
creating conclusive presumptions is section 16(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.197 This section conclusively presumes that, 
when a corporate director, officer or shareholder of over ten per cent 
of the stock buys .and sells securities of his corporation within a 
six-month period, he is trading on inside information. Thus, even 
if a corporate "insider," as statutorily defined, can prove that he had 
absolutely no access to inside information, he is still given no oppor-
tunity to rebut this presumption.198 Moreover, the impact of a vio-
lation on the individual can be very significant; as stated by Chief 
Judge Learned Hand in Gratz v. Claughton,199 "[t]he crushing lia-
bilities which Sec. 16(b) may impose are apparent from this action 
in which the judgment was for over $300,000; it should certainly 
serve as a warning, and may prove a deterrent."200 Reasonable alter-
native means are available to the government; the defendant could 
simply be allowed at his trial to show his lack of access to inside 
information.201 The burden of proving a negative may be heavy, 
but it is not as heavy as completely foreclosing the opportunity to 
present evidence.202 If it is too heavy, the burden could be placed 
197. 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)(b) (1970). This provision was upheld against a due process 
challenge in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 
(1943). 
198. See Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Alterna-
tive to "Burning Down the Barn in Order to Kill the Rats," 52 CORNELL L.Q. 69, 90 
(1966). But see Kem County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 
(19'73), and Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (19'73) (defendant not liable under section 16(b) 
where he did not have access to inside information; restricted to noncash, "unorthodox" 
transactions, such as mergers), both discussed in Note, Insider Liability for Short-Swing 
Profits: The Substance and Function of the Pragmatic Approach, 72 MICH. L. REv. 592 
(1974). 
199. 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951) •. 
200. 187 F.2d at 52. 
201. For a proposed change in section 16(b) to allow the defendant to present re-
buttal evidence on the issue of possession of inside information, see Munter, supra 
note 198, at 101. 
202. Munter, supra note 198, at 94. 
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on the government to p::,;ove access to inside infonnation; the gov-
ermnent must already prove actual access in actions for insider trad-
ing under rule IOb-5.203 WhiJe it may be argued that section 16(b) 
gives adequate waxning to corporate in!!iders, who can avoid. liability 
under the section by waiting iiix. months between trades, a similar 
opportunity to comply with the statute was availablt: to the plain-
tiffs in Vlandis; T.b.ey would .have peel\ classed as residents if they 
had moved to Connecticut before applying for admission, While 
a move that far in advance of th<:! school semester Jllay have been 
financially burdensome, it may be more costly for a corporate insider 
to hold securities for six month& in a falling market. 
The four examples cited above204 illustrate the fact that "con-
clusive presumptions" pervade the legal system, running the gamut 
from occupational licensing and welfare eligibility to traffic laws 
and securities regulation. None is likely to be "necessarily or uni-
versally true in fact," and i•reasonable alternative means" in the 
Vlandis sense of an individual determination will almost always be 
available to the state. Given the minimal degree of individual im-
pact of the rigid classification and the large additional administrative 
burden involved in a case~by,case determination in the Vlandis situ-
ation, it is difficult to see how the conclusive presumption doctrine 
in its most recently enunciated form can be limited. 
The doctrine has substantial difficulties that render it unsuitable 
as a mode of constitutional adjudication. Since most statutes are "con-
clusive presumptions" and none is "universally true," the Supreme 
Court's test provides no guidance as to when the doctrine is to 
result in invalidation. The approach, in essence, merely consists in 
the Court's conclusory declaration that the statute in question is 
an unacceptable conclusive presumption. 
If the doctrine is followed consistently, it would severely restrict 
the ability of legislatures to draft statutes that could be effectively 
administered.205 If the c;loctrine is not to be allowed to run roughshod 
over all existing legislation, it should be limited to statutory schemes 
dealing with important entitlements-Vlandis should be disre-
garded. It would be preferable. however, for the Court to abandon 
its "war on irrebuttable presµmptions"200 as theoretically un!lound 
and practically unworkable. 
203. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1973). See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 
833 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 V,S. 97G (1968). 
204. For additional examples, see LaFleur, 42 U.S.L.W. at 4194-95 (Rehnquist, J., dis· 
senting). 
2Q5. See LaFleqr1 42 U.S.L,W. at 4l94 (R~nquist, J., dissenting). 
206. LaFleur, 42 U.S.L.W. at 4194 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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III. AN EQUAL PROTECTION .ALTERNATIVE . ' 
By. using the equal protection clause to resolve the problem of 
the overinclusive burdening classification, many of the difficulties 
relating to the conclusive presumption doctrine can _be avoided.' 
First, with regard to cases involving governmental benefits, the equal 
protection clause is preferable, since there is no need to contend 
with the threshold due process requirement of a deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property.207 Second, since all equal protection ~nalysis is 
"substantive" in nature, the equal protection approach avoids the 
doctrinal confusion among the different functions, standards, and 
judicial roles associated with substantive and procedural .due pro-
cess. Third, a developed body of law is available to deal with cases 
involving discriminatory classifications. Finally, equal protection 
affords a ·more direct analysis of discri_minatory legislative· classifica-
tions, thus avoiding the problem of obfuscation that the conclusive 
presumption doctrine entails. 
The equal protection approach does, however, share two difficul-
ties with the conclusive presumption doctrine. Both solutions in-
volve substantive judicial intrusions into the public policy sphere,208 
and both must allow some overinclusiveness or inequality in the 
naµie of efficient administration. To minimize these difficulties, 
courts should exercise restraint in reviewing legislative classifications 
in the social and economic areas and, unless they are patently 
arbitrary, invalidate them only when necessary to avoid needless 
hardship. The following is a suggested standard for reviewing social 
and economic classifications under the equal protection clause, re-
flecting three fundamental values--preservation of the legislature's 
role in formulating public policy, avoidance of needless individual 
hardship, and conservation of administrative resources: An overin-
clusive burdening classification violates eq?fal protection when a 
more accurate individual determination would (1) avoid individual 
hardship and (2) be possible with little or no additional administra-
tive expense, even though there is a rational relationship between 
· 207. This is true only with respect to. state legislation, since equal protection as 
applied to the federal government is a component of due process and should therefore 
entail all of the requirements of the due process clause. This may mean that the states 
are subject.to different standards of equal protection than is the federal government. 
"[S]ince Congress is not expressly limited by any equal protection clause, it is not sub-
ject to the same limitation directed against discrimination as is imposed on the states." 
I'. KAUPER, supra note 142, at 690. See also Robison v. Johnson, 352 F. Supp. '848, 855 
(D. Mass.), revd., 42 U.S.L.W. 4313 (U.S., March 4, 1974): "[T]he appropriateness of 
subjecting federal legislation to equal protection analysis can only be determined on a 
case-by-case basis." This results in the application of a double standard to state and 
federal legislation faced with an equal protection challenge. 
208. See, e.g., Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 
1972 Sup. CT. REv. 41, 100. 
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the classification and the purpose of_ the legislation. This standard 
would serve the purpose presently served by the conclusive presump• 
tion doctrine, that is, it would act as a safety valve for avoiding 
hardship in cases where there is a rational basis for the classification 
but where no fundamental interest or suspect classification is in-
volved. The suggested standard differs from the conclusive pre-
sumption approach in three important respects: (1) It is based on 
the equal protection concept, rather than on due process; (2) it 
limits judicial review to cases of individual hardship; and (3) it 
requires a showing that the additional administrative burden would 
be small. 
If this standard were applied to Murry, the statutory provision 
would be struck down. While it did have a rational basis, the tax.-
dependency provision worked needless hardship on a number ot 
impoverished households.209 And it could be eliminated with little 
or no additional administrative burden.210 Likewise, in LaFleur the 
deprivation of the teachers' source of livelihood, was hardship, and 
there does not appear to be any substantial administrative problems 
with permitting each pregnant teacher to determine, with her physi-
cian's assistance, her own date to begin maternity leave. 
In Vlandis, however, the suggested standard would result in up• 
holding Connecticut's statutory definition of residency, for there 
was no showing of real individual hardship,211 and the additional 
administrative burden required by an individual determination is 
likely to be significant. 
Unlike the conclusive presumption doctrine, the suggested stan-
dard would not logically compel the invalidation of great numbers 
of federal and state legislative classifications. Yet, it would fulfill the 
need that led to the adoption of the conclusive presumption doc-
trine; it would reduce the rigidity of the present two-tiered standard 
of equal protection review. 
209. Incorrectly classifying appellees' impoverished households as nonneedy worked 
personal hardship in the form of hunger and even severe malnutrition. Brief for Ap• 
pellees at 17. 
210. The food stamp program had pre-existing procedures for determining the 
actual financial resources available to a household, so that any additional administra• 
live burden imposed by the decision was de minimus. Id. at 71. 
211. The personal hardship on appellees amounted to only a 450-dollars-per-semester 
tuition differential. As Chief Justice Burger pointed out in dissent, there was no allega• 
tion by either plaintiff "that the higher _out-of-state tuition charge does, will, or even 
may deprive her of the opportunity to attend the University of Connecticut," 412 U.S. 
at 461 n.•. 
